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A B S T R A C T
The European Union removed the block exemption granted under Regulation 4056/86, to liner 
shipping companies to provide scheduled services on a collaborative basis effective October 2008. 
This has also been followed by the proposed P3 alliance with participation of Maersk, MSC and 
CMA CGM. This paper explores, the arguments adopted by the US Federal Maritime Commission, 
the European Commission and the Ministry of Commerce of China, in rejecting the case proposed 
by the P3 alliance.  The findings of this paper will inform on understanding strategies adopted by 
major Competition Regulatory authorities in their interpretation of horizontal collaboration in the 
industry. 
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1. Background 
The global container shipping industry witnessed a major shift in 
economic regulation when the European Union removed the block 
exemption that had been granted to collaborative agreements since 1987 
under EU Council Regulation EC No. 4056/86. This Regulation (Official 
Journal No 378/4 of 31.12.86) had laid down detailed rules for applying 
the competition principles of the European Union Treaty to liner shipping 
transport services. However, by EC Council Regulation (EC) No 
1419/2006 of 25 September, the EU repealed Regulation (EEC) No 
4056/86, with effect from 18 October 2008. The removal of this block 
exemption and shift towards application of the provisions on competition 
in the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has raised 
international interests. This was apparent for example, when there 
followed a major study of the implications of the decision carried out by 
the US Federal Maritime Commission. In their report, the FMC came to 
the conclusion that the US would continue to apply the US Shipping Act 
of 1984 and allow collaboration among liner shipping companies to 
continue regardless of the stance taken by the European Union (FMC, 
2012). It is interesting that there were also emerging at this time 
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perspectives from other jurisdictions on how the future would be on 
whether strategies similar to the EU should be adopted. In this regard 
there were reviews on the application of competition law regimes on the 
container shipping industry in other major jurisdictions including China, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The period following the 
repeal of the EU Council Regulation, therefore led to reviews worldwide 
from regulatory authorities worldwide, on how best to interpret the legal 
implications of competition of an industry that provided for transport of 
global seaborne trade in containers.  
In order to place the regulatory regimes in context a unique opportunity 
emerged in a case which explored the relevance of competing economic 
regulations in June 2014. This case, reported in the media since 2013, was 
the P3 alliance which provided an opportunity to explore the approach of 
three major jurisdictions on the same set of facts with regard to the 
interpretation of the meaning of an acceptable alliance as a form of 
horizontal collaboration, which was proposed for the three main arterial 
services (Lloyd’s List, 2014; FMC, 2014; European Commission, 2014). 
In this case, the top three shipping companies in the industry, i.e. MSC, 
CMA-CGM and Maersk had in early 2013 declared their intention to form 
an operating alliance called the P3 Service Network and had made 
applications to seek approval or clarification with regard to compliance 
with the competition laws in a number of jurisdictions which would be 
covered by their services. The jurisdictions relevant here included the US 
Federal Maritime Commission, the European Commission and the 
Ministry of Commerce of China.  
Interestingly, the application from these carriers, also came at about the 
time when there were a number of developments in the industry which 
included for example, when in June 2013 there was the launching of the 
latest 18,000 teu capacity triple-E Maersk ships. This single move alone 
would bring the size of ships deployed in the container shipping sector 
into the ultra-large ship sector. Interestingly the entry of mega ships by 
Maersk had begun much earlier with the 1996 built, 6,400 teu ship 
followed by the 2006 built 15,000 teu ships, entering into service to 
potentially exploit economies of scale with larger ships. The very nature 
of scheduled services would on the one hand be effective through the 
deployment of larger ships that offer the scope to exploit economies of 
scale (Gardner et. al., 2002). However, on the other hand, considering the 
fleet of ships needed for scheduled services, had to consider, as they have 
done historically, to do this by working through the mechanism of 
horizontal collaboration including since 1875 with price and supply as the 
core components of these agreements (Marx, 1953, Gardner, 1999; Nair 
2008). While these collaborative agreements were basically anti-
competitive, they have been allowed to operate through the facility of 
exemptions from anti-competition laws of several international 
jurisdictions since 1916 (FMC, 2012; Nair, 2009; Marx, 1953) 
These regulatory authorities however have not all proceeded on the 
same basis in providing the framework of exemptions for collaborative 
agreements in the container shipping industry. While the industry had 
evolved within these multiple international jurisdictions, the continued 
regulatory challenges to the efforts by these shipping companies to 
provide scheduled services remain in varying degrees under their 
economic regulation (Nair, 2009; Marlow and Nair, 2010; Gardner et al, 
2002; Davies, 1980;) It was evident that even from the perspective of 
these economic regulators, there was a variety of interpretations to the 
application of diverse competition law regimes on the same set of facts in 
this very high capital intensive industry. At the same time, it is important 
to note that the industry continued to display features of concentration 
seen from the supply of capacity that was held by a few, coupled with the 
structure of actual fleet of larger ships also with the few carriers at the top 
of the table (FMC, 2012; Nair, 2009). Following all this, a unique 
opportunity emerged in mid-2013, when there was the announcement of 
these three world’s largest container shipping companies declaring their 
intention to form a horizontal collaboration through the alliance called the 
P3 Network service.   This study will explore the wider international 
debate that followed the decisions of major economic regulatory 
jurisdictions on the proposal by the top three carriers to collaborate 
through an alliance called the P3 service to ports in the main arterial 
routes.   
2. Research Method 
In this study the perspectives of relevant stakeholders who include not 
only regulatory authorities but also shipping companies and shippers, are 
explored as they respond to the P3 alliance in relation to the application of 
legal principles in a public law domain. These perspectives, from different 
global jurisdiction are on the similar facts, and in doing so the empirical 
facts as disclosed in the public domain of the P3 is selected as the case 
study method. The analysis will be on the basis of an interpretation on the 
statements of key stakeholders engaged in the phenomena under study as 
they are expressed in major professional media sources including Lloyd’s 
List. The statements and other published material are then discussed in 
order to draw any rationale or perceptible idea that may be emerging to 
explain the view that the global scenario is becoming hugely complicated. 
It is about a group of shipping lines who perceive in their wisdom that 
their services are best offered in a way that would require them to 
collaborate with other carriers in the groups although they are basically in 
competition with those other carriers. Their perception, as seen in the 
model they present to and the response of these competition authorities, 
provides a unique case study experience to see the way that the economic 
regulatory regimes interpret the perception of these shipping lines. This is 
explored through highlighting the decision process involving stakeholders 
who are making sense of the case submitted by business entities within 
the P3 network. 
2.1 Case Study
This study will firstly provide an outline of the P3 alliance, which is the 
collaboration agreement that has now reported to have been discontinued 
following, the international regulatory scrutiny. In order to explore issues 
from a wider perspective, the frame of the P3 will be compared to the G6 
alliance which has also been referred to by regulatory authorities as 
having distinctly different collaboration format.  A starting point for the 
analysis will be the approach taken by the US Federal Maritime 
Commission, when the case first entered the public domain in 2013. This 
will then form the basis for the analysis of the diverse interpretation to 
rules on competition as adopted by other selected regimes which are the 
European Commission and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The study 
will explore theoretical constructs on the rationale adopted by regulatory 
authorities when exploring horizontal collaboration within the framework 
of scheduled services and will then provide the format for the discussion 
for the study. This will then explore the likely future scenario to determine, 
if the regulatory frame presently applied appears to be hostile to the 
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supply-side challenges faced by container shipping companies.  
The three members of the P3 Network comprising Maersk Line, 
Mediterranean Shipping Co and CMA CGM filed for approval under the 
US Shipping Act of 1984, details of their vessel-sharing agreement with 
the Federal Maritime Commission in December 2013. Following this, the 
FMC called for a summit of regulators from the European Union, China 
and the FMC which took place in the US in December, 2013 (Porter, 
2013). According to Lloyd’s List, the FMC in its investigation would 
explore whether the agreement would have a negative impact on 
competitiveness and to approve if found to be not anti-competitive. In the 
event that the FMC concluded that the agreement was likely to reduce 
transport services or resulting in unreasonable increase in price, then 
under the US Shipping Act, the FMC would have to apply to a district 
court, which could either issue a temporary restraining order or 
preliminary injunction, or a permanent injunction against the P3 
agreement (Porter, 2013). In comparison, however, under the rules in the 
EU, the lines must conduct a self-assessment to ensure they do not abuse a 
dominant position and in China, there is another perspective, which is that 
the authorities regard this P3 joint fleet operation as a merger, delivering 
an added complication to the subject (Porter, 2013). 
The P3 fleet as constituted in the proposal would have comprised 255 
vessels initially with some 2.6m teu of capacity, with the fleet operated 
independently from a London-based office. Although they included the 
independent office in their collaboration, the carriers, in the agreement 
stated that they would negotiate separately with customers including when 
they set freight rates. (P3, 2014). The routes covered would be the arterial 
routes of transpacific, transatlantic and the Europe-Far East. 
3. Economic Regulatory Authorities 
The analysis of relevant regulatory authorities would be taken on a time 
line basis starting with the decision on the proposal of the P3 alliance 
adopted by the US Federal Maritime Commission, followed by the 
decision of the European Commission and finally the most recent decision 
in June 2014, of the Chinese Ministry of commerce. While there are likely 
to be other economic jurisdictions that are relevant to this case, these three 
selected jurisdictions can be regarded as crucial to the P3 to place their 
alliance into service along the major trade routes. The case study analysis 
will explore the implications arising from the decisions of these 
jurisdiction together exploring likely future scenario that are predicted 
both by accepted economic fundamentals as well as by expert statements 
by relevant stakeholders as reported in selected media.  
3.1 Federal Maritime Commission
Since the analysis is based on public statements, the approach that will 
be adopted will be to examine the initiative taken to have a meeting with 
others taken by the US Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). 
Interestingly, the FMC adopted an international profile to the application 
of the P3, which could have been due to the fact that the proposal of the 
alliance covered all the three major global arterial routes. Thus when the 
P3 had made its application to the FMC, there was the initiative also from 
the FMC that maritime regulators from the United States, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), and the European Commission met in 
Washington, D.C. in December 2013, to consider the international 
maritime landscape.  
This meeting in Washington preceded the consideration and decisions 
taken not only by the FMC, but also the European Commission and the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce. According to the FMC, the officials who 
met on the invitation of the FMC had open and candid discussions on their 
differing regulatory frameworks and the potential effects of carrier 
cooperation on international trade.  
The FMC Chairman Cordero stated: 
"I called for this Global Regulatory Summit given the rapidly 
changing face of the international maritime sector demands ‘out of the 
box’ thinking. The scope and size of the changes taking place provides 
an opportunity for our respective governments to dialogue and share 
our views on global regulatory challenges, and the impacts to 
international trade. …. From this Summit, I believe we all have a better 
understanding and appreciation for our respective legal regimes and 
views on global implications of the international maritime sector that 
we regulate." 
The Chinese delegate Mr. Li responded that: 
"We are very glad to have been invited by the FMC to attend the 
Summit. The United States, EU, and China are important economies in 
the world, and maritime transport plays a very important role. Ninety 
percent of China’s foreign trade is carried by sea. The sustainable 
growth of the maritime sector is of great importance to China and 
globally, and it is our common duty to protect the sound development of 
maritime transport. Through this summit we exchanged ideas about the 
maritime regulatory policies and rules and continue to strengthen our 
partnership." 
Finally the statement from the European Commission leader at the 
meeting, Mr. de Broca was that: 
"We welcome the opportunity to discuss our comparative regulatory 
regimes. Discussion is the best vehicle we have to share our collective 
expertise given that we each have different tools. We thank the FMC for 
initiating this summit and inviting us to participate what has been an 
informative dialogue." 
Following the summit, the P3 was the subject of separate consideration 
by the three regulatory authorities, and according to the March 20, 2014 
statement on their website, the FMC announced that it had concluded an 
extensive review of the P3 Network Vessel Sharing Agreement (FMC 
Agreement No. 012230). The Commission went on to add that it approved 
the agreement effective March 24, 2014, after the FMC received 
information on the agreement which concerned the sharing of vessels and 
other related cooperating activities in the trades between the U.S. and Asia, 
North Europe, and the Mediterranean (FMC, 2014) 
The Commission’s decision also noted that there could be 
circumstances that could permit the P3 Agreement parties at some point in 
the future, to unreasonably reduce services or unreasonably raise rates that 
could raise concerns under section 6(g) of the US Shipping Act of 1984. 
Since this was a key regulatory provision which the FMC had to address, 
the Commission included in its decision, certain reporting requirements to 
the P3 Agreement parties in order to assist the Commission in monitoring 
of the agreement (FMC, 2014). The FMC through the Chairman Cordero 
added that: 
"The Commission’s actions on the P3 Agreement takes into account 
the comprehensive, competitive analysis conducted by the FMC staff 
and comments received from shippers and other stakeholders. While 
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the agreement is expected to produce operational efficiencies for the 
benefit of the U.S. consumer, the new reporting requirements 
specifically tailored to this agreement’s unique authority will ensure we 
have timely and relevant information to act quickly should it be 
necessary,…"  
The FMC has therefore seen that the agreement would produce benefits 
that outweighed any negative impacts and that there were reporting and 
monitoring mechanisms in place to ensure that the alliance would deliver 
as proposed in their agreement.  
3.2 European Union
When exploring the position of the EU, a useful starting point will be to 
be aware that the European Commission had recently taken the decision 
not to extend the block exemption granted under EEC 4056/86 to liner 
agreements, contained in EC Council Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006 of 
25 September, 2006 and which took effect from October, 2008. Following 
this outcome, the interpretation of the EU with regard to the legal 
implications of horizontal collaboration would have to be seen from the 
statements made public to interpret and decide upon behaviour among 
shipping companies in the industry.  An opportunity to examine the 
approach to interpretation adopted by the European Commission was 
provided when referring to the public debate on the conformity of the 
same P3 alliance that proposed their service to ports in the European 
Union. When exploring interpretations to the position of the European 
Union, it is also useful to acknowledge that around the same time that the 
P3 alliance was under scrutiny by the European Commission, there was 
also the decision of the EC to extend consortia rules (Porter, 2014, 
Lloyd’s List Intelligence) for a further five years. The arguments raised by 
the EC as the basis for the decision on consortia are relevant and will be 
raised here since this will inform understanding the current debate on 
collaboration within transnational alliances.  
The EC has confirmed that the maritime consortia block exemption will 
remain in place until April 2020 and will extend the existing regulation 
that was due to expire next year, 2015. The EC, had concluded that the 
exemption has worked well, providing legal certainty to agreements which 
bring benefits to customers and do not unduly distort competition, and 
that current market circumstances warrant a prolongation. The first 
consortia block exemption regulation was adopted in 1995 and prolonged 
several times. Under these latest consortia rules, the EU would allow lines 
with a combined market share under 30% to enter into co-operation 
agreements referred to as consortia, for another five years. The extension 
of this rule followed a lengthy review of the industry practices on these 
operational efficiency agreements that had been in operation since the 
application of the exemption rules in 1987 (Porter, 2014; Nair, 2012; 
FMC, 2012). 
The view here is that the commission favours co-operation that allows 
member shipping lines to reduce costs, as long as customers benefit from 
the greater operating efficiencies (Porter, 2014).  In their statement 
released with the extension of the consortia rules, the EC stated that:  
“If consortia face sufficient competition and are not used to fix prices or 
share the market, users of services provided by consortia are usually able 
to benefit from improvements in productivity and service quality…” 
(Porter, 2014). 
There has also been stakeholder support for consortia for example with 
the European Shippers' Council stating that:
"Historically, the ESC has had no major problem with the principles 
of the consortia regulation. … The ESC views consortia and alliances 
as the most acceptable and preferable form of cooperation between 
shipowners (provided they meet the requirements set out in the EU 
Consortia Block Exemption Regulation). … It has always been the 
ESC's view that consortia can potentially provide the opportunity for 
genuine economies of scale, enhanced efficiency and cost reduction." 
This discussion on the consortia reveals that the EU does acknowledge 
that scheduled services are efficiently provided through some form of 
horizontal collaboration, although within the limits as outlined. When 
referring to the case under study here, i.e. the P3 alliance, and therefore in 
cases where for an alliance, their market shares exceed the market share 
threshold established in the consortia exemption regulation, the legal 
procedure is that the companies themselves have to make sure that their 
agreements comply with the law. Therefore when their market share 
exceeded the 30 per cent threshold in the consortia regulation, the EC 
would responded by exploring whether there were sufficient grounds to 
open an anti-competitive investigation in order to determine whether there 
is compliance to the EU rules. In the case of the P3 alliance, the members’ 
market share did go beyond the threshold and therefore the alliance had to 
wait for the determination as to whether the EC would open the 
investigation.  
In this case, the EC has decided not to initiate investigation on the P3, 
however, in their announcement did state that certain safeguard provisions 
were made known to the parties in the P3 alliance application. Further, it 
is also noted that the EC had soon after this, announced the renewal of the 
consortia regulation and thus taking a position that showed that the EU 
favoured collaboration among shipping companies providing scheduled 
services. In so far as the procedure for the P3 was concerned, the EU 
approach was that because of the market share threshold size, the P3 
would have fallen outside Europe’s consortia requirements and in such 
circumstances applicant member lines would have to conduct a self-
assessment to ensure they were in compliance with EU competition law. 
The indication that the agreement would not be allowed is when there is 
an initiation of an investigation and in this case there would be none by 
the European Commission.
It would now be appropriate to examine the recent decision on the same 
P3 by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and to explore the international 
public law issues that the decision raised, when seen against the 
background of the FMC and the decision of the European Commission.  
3.3 China Ministry of Commerce
According to report on 17 June, 2014, the Ministry of Commerce of 
China rejected the application of members in P3 Network which would 
have provided scheduled services on the basis of the alliance among the 
three largest container carriers (Jing Yang, Lloyd’s List, 2014). The 
review process took more than seven months and came just after decisions 
from the US Federal Maritime Commission and the European 
Commission with regard to the P3 services.  The principal argument 
raised in the decision was that, the applicants, viz., Maersk Line, 
Mediterranean Shipping Co and CMA CGM would through their alliance 
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network be able to alter their structure that would lead to greater 
concentration in the industry (Leander and Yang, 2014: Lloyd’s List) and 
therefore: 
“Based on a comprehensive analysis of market share, market access 
and industry characteristics, MofCom concludes that, if completed, the 
concentration will enable the operators to become a close-knit alliance, 
commanding 47% market share in Asia-Europe container liner service 
and will result in a significant increase in market concentration rate,”  
When examining the arguments that are now in the public domain, the 
core element of the decision on the principle of concentration and its 
likely negative impact on consumers of services was highlighted. In their 
statement, the MoC mentioned that: 
“After evaluation, MofCom thinks the relief plans lack 
corresponding legal grounds and convincing supporting evidence and 
that they failed to prove the proposed concentration will bring more 
advantages than disadvantages to market competition, or in 
accordance with public interest. Therefore, MofCom decides to forbid 
such concentration of business operators according to the Anti-
Monopoly Law.” 
The reference to concentration was emphasized by findings that the 
analysis showed that the Asia Europe container shipping market will see 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a commonly accepted gauge for market 
concentration; rise from 890 to 2240 after P3 is formed. Further, the three 
lines combined will retain a capacity share of 46.7%, with Maersk Line, 
MSC and CMA CGM commanding 20.6%, 15.2% and 10.9% respectively. 
Thus, from a position of policy, the view is that there will be adverse 
impacts on both shippers and ports and this is argued by the statement that:  
 “The review finds out that shippers are inferior when negotiating 
freight rates. [P3] parties may take advantage of the increased market 
share to undermine shippers’ interest.” 
“The concentration will also enhance the parties’ bargaining power 
against ports. In order to vie for calls, ports may be forced to accept 
lower handling charges, which will cast adverse impact on the 
development of ports.”  (Yang, 2014):  
The Ministry of Commerce also made another argument to reject the P3 
application and this referred to the proposed joint fleet-operation center of 
the P3 to be based in London. This center which would be set to operate 
as a separate legal entity in London was deemed a factor that made this 
alliance “essentially different” from other container alliances. The 
statement went on to add in its official ruling that: 
 “In the case [of P3], the participants integrate all of their capacity 
in the east-west trades through a network centre, which makes itself 
essentially different from traditional shipping alliances in aspects 
including the form of co-operation, operational management and cost 
sharing,” (Jing Yang Thursday, 19 June 2014- Lloyd’s List 
Intelligence)
The overall impression arising from the listing of the basis for the 
decision of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce is that there is a strong 
position to reject the P3 Network and this of course as seen earlier is in 
sharp contrast to the decisions taken in Washington and Brussels.  
It is also useful to note that, according to the information on the site of 
the Ministry of Commerce there is no right of appeal on this decision, 
which is based on the Anti-Monopoly adopted in 2007. This Act of 2007, 
require companies that propose to concentrate, as in this case the three 
carriers who intended to form the P3 alliance, to lodge a declaration with 
the MofCom.  
There were also voices, within Chia, in support of this decision by the 
MoC, to reject the P3 alliance.  The vice-chairman of the China Shippers’ 
Association, Mr Cai Jiaxiang said:  
“We welcome MofCom’s decision, which is a very wise one. 
MofCom’s analysis entirely reflects the reality. P3 indeed excludes 
competition.”
The vice-chairman went on to add that  
“P3 will greatly hurt the interest of China’s exporters,” he said. 
“China’s situation is different from that in the US, where there are no 
international lines. If P3 comes online, eventually it will be China’s 
exporters that bear the costs of the surcharges that always go up and 
never go down.P3’s market share in China trade will probably exceed 
65%. It was never looked into, but I estimate just Maersk Line alone 
already reaches the 30% cap set by China’s international maritime 
regulation.” 
4. Analysis  
In order to understand the flow of arguments and where there could be 
clear divergences in the interpretation or similar views on the facts as 
proposed by the P3 alliance, it would be appropriate to bring together the 
key elements in all the three decisions. Since the decision of the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce does go clearly distinctly separate from the 
decisions of the FMC and the European Commission, the analysis will 
explore the Chinese decision as the core and how both the other two 
reflect upon this decision.  
Here, it would be appropriate to explore initially the view of the US 
Federal Maritime Commission on the decision of the Chinese MoC and on 
this subject, the FMC made a statement on June 18, 2014 as follows:  
 “The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) notes the decision 
announced by its Chinese regulatory counterpart, the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM), with regard to the P3 Network Vessel Sharing 
Agreement. The agreement between A. P. Moller-Maersk A/S, CMA 
CGM S.A., and MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company, S.A. would 
have authorized the parties to share vessels and engage in related 
cooperative operating activities in the trades between the U.S. and Asia, 
North Europe, and the Mediterranean. 
In March 2014, the FMC concluded extensive review of the Trans-
Pacific and Trans-Atlantic effects of the P3 Agreement and determined 
that the agreement was not likely at that time, by a reduction in 
competition, to produce an unreasonable increase in transportation 
cost or an unreasonable reduction in transportation service under 
section 6(g) of the Shipping Act. P3 Agreement parties would have been 
subject to specifically tailored monitoring reports to ensure compliance 
with the Shipping Act once the agreement became operational. The 
Commission’s decision remains in effect absent a withdrawal of the 
agreement by the parties. 
"Ocean carrier vessel space alliances offer the potential benefit of 
cost savings and environmental efficiencies that come from coordinated 
deployment of newer, larger vessels. The FMC, in evaluating such 
agreements, will continue to balance those benefits with the potential 
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harm from a concentration of decision-making power in terms of port 
coverage, sailing schedules, and necessary trade lane capacity," stated 
Chairman Cordero.” 
The statement from the FMC could possibly reflect the view that a 
response is needed, since firstly not only is the decision of the Chinese 
MoC, in contrast to that delivered by the FMC in March, 2014, but 
secondly it follows upon the decision to hold joint consultation initiated 
by the FMC in December, 2013.  
It would be useful to refer here to the lone voice in the FMC who had 
voted against the P3 decision of the FMC who came out in support of the 
decision of the MoC, i.e. Commissioner Richard Lindinsky. He stated in 
response to the decision from China, that:  
“So I am personally pleased that other regulatory colleagues 
apparently shared my concerns over the excessive dangers to all of 
maritime commerce of the late P3 combination.” 
He then added that: 
“it was apparent that the Chinese maritime authorities fully 
understood and appreciated not only their national, but international 
responsibilities, in this landmark case, and by studious and serious 
process, have taken a decision that will benefit carriers and shippers of 
all nations.” 
Lloyd’s List in its earlier report had mentioned that FMC 
commissioners voted four to one in support of P3, but with modifications 
to the agreement and stipulating that it should be monitored closely. 
While there was not a response from the European Commission, there 
was the response in support of the decision of the Moc from Europe was 
from the European Shippers’ Council (ESC). The ESC stated that the P3 
Network had failed to convince the regulatory authorities in China, on the 
benefits of the alliance and in its response to the decision from China went 
on to state that:   
“The ESC understands this decision since it has already expressed 
its concern about the risk of dominant situation created by an alliance 
that could represent 44% of market shares for trades between China 
and Europe. 
“This danger had also been evoked by the US Federal Maritime 
Committee which had coupled its green light given to P3 with strict 
conditions of control, unlike the European Union which had authorised 
the P3 without condition.” 
The reference by the ESC is to the nature of concentration that would 
evolve from this P3 service and went on its statement that: 
“On the Transatlantic trades the P3 Network would for example 
have a market share of 44 percent,” it said. (Porter, J; 2014) 
According to the ESC, there was the fear that this 44 percent would be 
able to create a potential non-competitive environment and in view of that 
it was necessary to ensure: 
“the free choice of shippers should be and remain the highest 
priority. Individual shipping lines have to distinguish on price, service 
levels and routing”. 
As mentioned earlier, the EC had not only decided not to open 
investigations on the P3, but had also just after the MoC decision 
announced their intention to renew the consortia regulations.  
There are therefore variations in the interpretations of the impact of 
collaboration on competition seen from the perspective of these three 
major jurisdictions on the same set of facts as presented by the P3 case.  
5. Discussion
Since this survey of the decision of major economic regulatory 
jurisdictions raise important international public policy issues, it would be 
useful to examine in some detail on aspects of the P3 which has been 
highlighted by the Chinese authorities. For example, the Ministry of 
Commerce of China referred to another major alliance, the G6, which had 
also been announced at the same time as the P3. According to industry 
sources, it was estimated that on the transatlantic route, the two alliances, 
i.e. P3 and G6 would have a combined market share of as much as 82%, 
with Hapag-Lloyd estimating that the G6 would have a market share of 40% 
on services between Europe and North America and the FMC estimating 
that the P3 carriers will have a 42% share. (Brett and Leander, 2014). 
Further there is also the view that according to Brett, D, (2014) the G6 
Alliance is thought to be more of a traditional alliance than the P3 set-up 
and is not expected to be affected by Chinese regulators’ decision to stop 
the P3 Network.  
Some arguments presented by Brett (2014) in contrasting the G6, were 
that the G6 Alliance was already operational on the Asia-North Europe, 
Asia-Mediterranean and transpacific east coast trade lane. Further, it was 
only expanding onto the transatlantic and transpacific west coast trade 
lanes, unlike the P3, which is a new start-up proposing to cover all three 
major trade routes.  
Further, the only part of this expansion of the G6 that would affect 
China is the transpacific west coast move. This followed by the reported 
material that the MoC, in their decision suggested that the G6 was a more 
traditional slot sharing alliance than the P3 Network. In order that the 
variations as well as approaches to the decisions made among the 
regulatory authorities with focus on the decision of the MoC, it would be 
useful to highlight the key aspects.  
The principal elements relevant to the decision on the format of the P3 
in terms of the differences are shown in the box below. 
P3 G6-Traditional 
z much more control by 
coordination center, as they 
would be responsible for 
operational procedures 
z only slot/vessel share 
z operational costs would be 
calculated by trades and split 
between the carriers, with set 
voyage costs 
z would each be responsible for t
heir own costs  
z the center would be responsible 
for selling unused slots 
z would individually sell spare 
slots 
z the center would make decisions 
on service suspensions 
z would make operational decisi
ons - including service suspens
ions - through a committee 
As is evident from the information in the table above, the view of the 
MoC was that the co-ordination office that the G6 Alliance planned to set 
up would operate along the model of a committee. In contrast, the same 
Ministry was of the view that the P3 service centers would have a separate 
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company with a separate legal entity. It is evident that the level of 
reasoning to highlight criteria for the decision is entering new terrain and 
it may be useful for container shipping lines in future to be aware that 
there are different dimensions of collaboration, all of which are seen 
differently by different economic regulators.  
Arguing along these lines, the MoC was of the view that the market 
share threshold figures of the P3 Network on the Asia-Europe trade could 
be as high as 48% and that  the G6 was a “true alliance”. This is a new 
concept that would need to be defined on a global context for container 
shipping lines that would want to collaborate on the basis of an alliance or 
even as a consortia, what is a “true alliance”.  
Interestingly, a view that was similar to the concept of a “true alliance” 
was offered by the US FMC Commissioner, Richard Lidinsk, who had 
stated that the G6, with: 
“…organisational chart, multi-diverse membership, rotating 
chairmen, vessel-sharing agreement terms and flexible operational 
procedures, it is well-equipped to serve the international waterborne 
commerce of the US in a fair and efficient manner,…”. 
The G6, which is made up of APL, Hapag-Lloyd, Hyundai Merchant 
Marine, Mitsui OSK Lines, Nippon Yusen Kaisha and OOCL, had its plan 
to extend to the transatlantic and Asia-US west coast trade lanes 
unanimously approved by all five FMC commissioners in April, 2014. 
However, Mr Lidinsky was the sole FMC commissioner who had voted 
against the P3 Network although it was approved by the FMC, as the four 
other commissioners voted in its favor. 
In explaining the decision, Mr Lidinsky said the P3 agreement would 
allow the controlling carrier the ability, when coupled with existing 
discussion agreements, to deploy its assets along with those of the other 
two carriers, to dominate vessel competition and narrow shipper options at 
US ports. Finally there is the observation of SeaIntel shipping analyst 
Kasper Hansen, who recently remarked that the G6 centre could work 
more like a co-ordination centre, whereas the P3’s would function like a 
manager of fleet operations. The arguments raised for the decision to 
reject the P3 by the Chinese authorities show that there are new legal 
grounds emerging and which are not seen similarly by different regulatory 
authorities.
More recently are the reflections on the P3 decisions that VSA between 
container lines promote competition and enable smaller companies ‘to 
stay in business’ as stated by a lawyer for Maersk, i.e. Holtse, Camilla 
Jain, amid concerns on potential powers of new global alliances emerging 
in the global industry (Porter, 2014). 
It will be useful to note that, following the failure to receive the 
regulatory approval required, two major players in the original P3, namely 
Maersk and MSC went on to form the 2M alliance. The third carrier, 
CMA CGM is now in collaboration with CSCL and UASC in another 
alliance, the Ocean Three. The collaboration permutations among carriers 
are not over, and we are witnessing formation of other alliances emerging 
to serve the main arterial trades. It is likely that these forms of horizontal 
collaboration will continue; although, the broad frame of the P3 will be 
the guide to ensure global regulatory compliance.  
6. Reflections and Conclusions 
There is clearly a situation where the interpretation given to these 
collaborative arrangements by liner shipping companies are different. This 
has led to statements on the need for some form of rationalisation in the 
international interpretation of the validity of this collaboration agreement. 
One view on this has been raised by Mr Woolich, an industry analyst, who 
said at the 2014 TOC Europe Conference in London, that:  
 “The P3 deal is a classic example of how the industry would benefit 
hugely from there being a worldwide competition authority.” 
(Nightingale, 2014) 
This view appears to be similar to that stated by Analyst MDS 
Transmodal, who referred to the element of ‘level of market share’ that 
were raised during the investigation by regulators. This they regard as a 
crucial component that should be public knowledge in so far as it 
concerned what is acceptable for alliances operating in the main trade 
route (Brett, 2014b). On the same point, the analyst went on to state that:  
“The Federal Maritime Commission, the EU Commission and the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce should perhaps come out with some 
clearer and consistent indications of what is/is not acceptable for fair 
global competition,” the analysts said. (Brett, 2014b) 
Following the uncertainty that was created by the decision from China, 
according to Drewry, cited in Lloyd’s List: 
“The P3 (sic.)…  might even be allowed to form a trilateral 
consortium in the transpacific, as their current 20% market share of 
effective eastbound vessel capacity to the west coast alone is well below 
the G6’s 34%,” Drewry said. 
“This would enable them to deploy surplus ultra-large container 
vessels from the Asia-Europe trade lane on the route, and cascade the 
displaced vessels into other services, which may well have been 
envisaged at the outset of P3.” 
Drewry is of the view that in the transatlantic trade, there could even be 
the option to set up the P3 Network in the form of joint services. There are 
now obviously views that a diverse range of options will be explored and 
Drewry also stated that: 
“Because the US Federal Maritime Commission and the European 
Commission have not blocked the alliance, the three carriers could 
decide to implement joint services on the transatlantic route, as 
planned, even without a P3 global setup. 
According to Lloyd’s List (Nightingale, 2014b), Drewry Maritime 
Research senior analyst Neil Davidson believes that the P3 carriers may 
have to explore other options, and thus to be better positioned to the 
arguments raised by Beijing. He is quoted as saying that:  
 “Could two or the three lines form a kind of P2 alliance…Or could 
there be moves to involve one or both of the big Chinese lines in some 
kind of alliance, in order to establish a better position with the Chinese 
authorities?...The fact is that in order to fill very large ships, carriers 
have to get together more, and so further alliance-related developments 
seem likely – the story doesn’t end here” 
This reinforces the theoretical arguments that the very basis of 
scheduled services which has been in existence since 1875 from the 
UK/Calcutta Conference has been through joint collaboration beginning 
with price and supply agreements (Marx, 1953; Gardner et al., 2002). 
Further it is also known that their price ratio of very high fixed to variable 
costs, also makes it inevitable that the route to stability in the provision of 
scheduled services is through horizontal collaboration (Davies, 1980; 
Marx, 1953, Nair, 2008; Gardner et al., 2002; Mason and Nair, 2012; Nair 
2013). There is the acceptance of the need for collaboration even as seen 
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in the decision of the FMC and the EU. 
At the time of writing, and as mentioned earlier  Maersk and 
Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) announced their 10-year vessel 
sharing agreement (VSA) to be deployed on the main trade routes as an 
alternative to the P3 alliance that did not receive the Chinese regulatory 
approval (Walters, 2014). In this VSA referred to as the 2M, the combined 
market share would be much smaller than the P3, and the cooperation will 
be only on a VSA basis without the likes of the operations centre under 
the P3 and thus avoiding some of the objections raised in the Chinese 
decision to reject the P3. In their statement to the media, the VSA would 
also not include joint marine operations where each party would take care 
of their own stowage, voyage and port operations. The Walters (2014) 
report contained the statement that emphasised the element of fully 
independent sales, pricing, marketing and customer service functions 
within the 2M VSA. These elements appear to address concerns of the 
Chinese and the restrictions that were put on the P3 applications.  
The lines which form the top three in the world have to address their 
operational challenges such as their ability to exploit the economies of 
scale offered by larger ships within the constraints of regulatory regimes 
when exploring the limits to horizontal collaboration. They would have to 
take into account that while the major jurisdictions have allowed some 
form of collaboration, the exact format of these limits are not clearly spelt 
out and could be more likely be regarded as a decision made on a case by 
case basis. The scale of the confusion that prevails based on the reading of 
the public debate could be daunting for these liner shipping companies 
that are striving to provide the global stretch in scheduled services for 
container services. The regulatory authorities are in the case of the P3 
giving different interpretations to the same set of fact and are seen to be 
explaining their decisions in terms of aspects such as market share, global 
coverage, position in the international list by the leading suppliers and 
their proposal to set up a joint operations centre. It is evident from the 
comments that are emerging that the broad nature of collaboration is not 
clearly defined and the attempt for example by the FMC to attain a 
common understanding before all went their way to look at the details 
may not have been achieved. Interestingly the core points raised by the 
Chinese authorities are now being seen as a major yardstick that could be 
adopted especially by the liner shipping companies themselves to set their 
platform for future collaboration among their competitors. We have now 
at the time of writing seen another development that is the creation of the 
new 2M alliance between Maersk and MSC, which already are based on 
what these two carriers determine would be within and ‘off limits’ they 
expect from these regulatory authorities and we will explore these ideas in 
future research.  
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